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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the question of whether the imposition of developer infrastructure charges on 
housing developers affects the price of residential land.  Developer paid fees or charges are a 
commonly used mechanism for local governments to fund new infrastructure as a “user pays” method 
of funding new urban infrastructure.   Some argue these costs are passed back to the original land 
owner by way of lower land prices.  However, property developers claim these charges are added on 
to new land prices, with flow on negative impact to housing affordability.  
This paper presents the findings of a hedonic land price model that provides the first empirical 
evidence that infrastructure charges do increase residential land prices in Brisbane, Australia.  This 
research is consistent with international findings and supports the proposition that developer paid 
infrastructure charges are over-passed to home buyers and are a significant contributor to reduced 
housing affordability. 
Keywords: Housing Affordability, infrastructure charges, impact fees, house prices, land prices, 
residential land 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Housing affordability is an agenda item at all levels of government in Australia and 
many other countries around the world.   This paper examines the question of whether the 
imposition of infrastructure charges on housing developers affects the price of subdivided 
vacant residential land.  Developer paid fees or charges are a commonly used mechanism for 
local governments to fund new infrastructure as a “user pays” method of funding new urban 
infrastructure.   Some argue these costs are passed back to the original land owner by way of 
lower land prices (AEC Group, 2010).  However, property developers claim these charges are 
added on to new house prices, with flow on negative impact to housing affordability (UDIA, 
2007). 
This study utilises hedonic modelling to empirically examine the effect of infrastructure 
charges on 13,739 new vacant residential lot prices in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia in the 
years 2005 - 2011.  Brisbane is the State capital of Queensland and is the major metropolitan 
centre of South-East Queensland which is Australia’s third largest metropolitan region.  
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The term “Infrastructure Charges” is a term that is used to encompass the estimated 
proportionate cost of providing trunk and other off-site urban infrastructure such as local 
roads, stormwater and community facilities and parks to new developments.  It is a one off 
charge levied on the developer, generally at the time of rezoning/planning approval (Bryant 
& Eves, 2014, Been, 2005, Burge, 2008, Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 2004, Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003). 
The purpose of this research is to provide evidence that the imposition of developer 
infrastructure charges increases the price of subdivided and serviced residential lots.  This is 
important due to the “house and land” package market that prevails in many Australian cities.  
With a “house and land” package, greenfield land developers sell the vacant serviced lots to 
new home buyers, who then enter into a construction contract with a house builder.  This 
two-step method of providing housing has evolved as it ensures a variety in housing product 
is supplied in new estates, maximises internal rates of return for land developers, supports a 
cottage builder industry and the consumer benefits from significant transfer duty savings 
possible by the separate contract approach. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Further to the introduction, the 
next section outlines the key literature on this topic. Sections three and four detail the 
methodology adopted and data requirements respectively.  The fifth section presents the 
research findings and the final section concludes. 
 
LITERATURE 
In the US, there is a well-established body of empirical research that has evolved 
around the cost impact of infrastructure charges on new housing.  Infrastructure charges were 
originally intended to transfer the burden of infrastructure provision in high growth areas 
from the public purse on to developers (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003).  However, in a 
competitive market, and subject to the various prevailing market elasticities, the literature is 
consistent in its conclusions that despite market conditions (i.e. relative market elasticities) 
infrastructure charges are passed onto home buyers in the long run and will thus lead to 
increased housing prices (Been, 2005, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003, Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004, Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006).   
In excess of a dozen separate US studies on the price impacts of infrastructure charges 
on new housing, existing housing and vacant residential lots have been published since 1989.   
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However, review of the existing empirical works reveal it is a danger to assume that passing 
or shifting of infrastructure charges are at parity (that is $1.00 extra for infrastructure charges 
equals $1.00 passed on or back).  Consistent with theory, the empirical research to date is 
consistent in providing evidence of on-passing and indeed “over passing” or “over shifting” 
of infrastructure charges to new (and existing) house buyers (Bryant & Eves, 2014, Been, 
2005, Burge, 2008, Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 2004, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004, 
Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003).  In studies of the new housing market as a whole, a $1.00 
infrastructure charge is attributed to a price increase of as little as a $0.25 increase in new 
house price (Dresch and Sheffrin, 1997) and up to $3.21 increase in new house price (Singell 
and Lillydahl, 1990).  With the evolution of better specified models, the research in the last 
decade from the US indicates that for every $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges, new 
housing costs increase $1.50 to $1.70 (Nelson et.al., 2008).  This concept of “over shifting” 
for housing is consistent across all of the empirical research dating back to the 1980’s.   
However the majority of these studies have focused on the effect on new houses, with 
evidence on price impacts for vacant residential lots being thin.  Skaburskis and Qadeer 
(1992) suggested evidence of on-passing of 120% of the impact fee to serviced residential lot 
prices, whilst Evans-Cowley et al., (2005) provided weak evidence that a $1.00 infrastructure 
charge is attributed to a price increase of as little as a $0.13 for a serviced residential lot 
(Evans-Cowley et al., 2005).   
The absence of empirical data on the effect infrastructure charges have on residential 
land prices is fuelling the debate in Australia as to whether infrastructure charges do get 
passed on to residential land buyers or not.  This is a significant gap in the Australian 
research, and this paper seeks to provide the first empirical study of its kind in Australia to 
address this gap.   
 
METHOD 
The use of an ordinary least squares (“OLS”) hedonic regression model is appropriate 
for this study.  The hedonic approach is a relatively straightforward method once the requisite 
data is acquired and transformed into the appropriate scale and format.  The relative 
simplicity of the hedonic approach is one of its strengths and hence why it has been in use 
since Rosen’s seminary work in 1974 and forms the core of studies identified in the literature 
above.  The adopted form for this study is:   
4 
 
 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܮ௜ ൅ ߚଷܬ௜ ൅ ߚସܩ௜൅	ݑ௜,௧   Equ.1 
Where   
Pi,t =  sale price of house i in time period t 
Si =  Structural attributes of the lot: lot area  
Li =  Locational features:  region, socio-economic suburb rankings 
Ji = Jurisdictional factors: changes to household income levels, population growth, 
new housing supply, unemployment rate,  construction cost index,  mortgage 
interest rates;  consumer confidence 
Gi = Government policy: infrastructure charges 
ݑ௜,௧ =  error term or noise in the model for the ith observation at time t. 
 
DATA  
This study examines the effect of infrastructure charges on new residential lot prices in  
Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.  Brisbane is the State capital of Queensland and is the major 
metropolitan centre of South-East Queensland which is Australia’s third largest metropolitan 
region, with a population of over 2.1 million people (ABS, 2012).  The data used for this 
study includes a sample of suburbs in Brisbane’s northern growth corridor as well as the 
same in Brisbane’s southern growth corridor.  The study period for this research is from 2005 
to 2011.   
Full sales record data for all vacant residential lots for the period 2005 to 2011 in the 
local government areas in this study was provided by Price Finder, a commercial re-seller of 
the state and local government sales records.  This provided the structural data including:  
address, real property description, lot size, sale price, sale date (contract date), settlement 
date, zoning, sale type, land use, buyer and seller details.  Sales data was cleansed to remove:  
non arm’s length transactions, part sales, multiple transaction sales, and court order 
transactions.   
Next locational data was considered.  In order to take factors such as some suburbs in 
the study areas being more or less desirable than others into consideration, the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics’ (“ABS”) “Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and 
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Disadvantage” (IRSAD) was utilised.  This index provides a 1 – 10 rating at a suburb level as 
a relative measure of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage.   
Jurisdictional data was sourced from the ABS web site, with the exception of data on 
the 30 year home mortgage rates, consumer sentiment and inflation, which was sourced from 
the Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) web site.  Where monthly or quarterly data existed, 
annual averages were derived (by calendar year).   Data on common supply and demand 
house price drivers were sought at a local government level (rather than State level) to ensure 
regional sub-market effects were suitably accommodated.  The local government area of 
“Brisbane” was used for the southside data set, and “Moreton Bay” used for the northside 
data set, with both being part of the Greater Brisbane metropolitan area.  
Infrastructure charge data is not readily available in Queensland and has been a limiting 
factor in the progression of this type of research.  In order to access such data, large private 
land developers were approached to supply infrastructure charge data for their projects.  The 
developers that were approached supplied data on the infrastructure charges levied on their 
projects in the study area.  The total infrastructure charges applicable to a stage were divided 
by the number of lots in that stage to determine the charge per lot.  The applicable rate per 
annum was derived from the year the stage was released and sold and adopted as the average 
infrastructure charge applicable in the study area.  A one year lag was applied to account for 
the time between development approval and completion of the project.    
The final data set for this study comprised a total of 13,739 vacant residential land 
sales.   Table1 describes the independent variables utilised in the model estimation.  
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Table 1  Variable Legend 
Variable  Definition 
Structural   
SQM  Lot size in square metres 
   
Locational   
REGION  Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Brisbane Northside (0) or Southside (1) 
IRSAD  1‐10  ranking of suburb as indicated by the Index of Relative Socio‐economic Advantage and Disadvantage 
   
Jurisdictional   
YEAR  Time variable for year of sale 
POPRATE  Percentage rate of change in population (LGA*)
INCOME  Percentage increase in median household income (LGA*)
BDLG  Percentage change in building approvals  (LGA*)
UNEMP  Unemployment rate (LGA*) 
CONSTN  Percentage change in construction cost index for Brisbane (capital city)
MTGE  Average 30 year mortgage rate (Australia)
CONSS  Consumer sentiment index (Australia)
   
Policy Attributes   
IC  Annual infrastructure charge adopted on a per lot basis, based on year of sale of lot.
FHOG  Dummy variable indicating whether the sale occurred in a year with a high FHOG (1 in 2009 for new and existing, 1 in 
2011 for new only) or normal FHOG (0) 
*LGA = data obtained at a local government area level 
 
FINDINGS 
A step-wise approach was adopted to test the additional predictive value of the model 
upon the inclusion of more independent variables.  The structural elements were regressed 
initially, with locational elements added in a second step, then the jurisdictional and 
government (policy) elements added in the final step.  The results of the process using 13,739 
Brisbane Lot data are indicated in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2  Step Wise Process Model Summary- Lots d 
  R Adjusted R Std Error of   Change Statistics   
Model R Square Square Estimates R2 
Change
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
change 
1 .571a .326 .326 83251.851 .326 6649.6 1 13737 .000 
2 .631b .399 .398 78655.266 .072 551.82 3 13734 .000 
3 .641c .411 .411 77847.298 .013 36.821 8 13726 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Area, (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Region, SEIFA, Year (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Region, SEIFA, Year, A_Cci, A_Css, AC_Inc, AC_Bul, IA_Ifc_1L, AC_Pop, A_Mgr, A_Upr (Structural + 
Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable:  IA_Price 
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These findings indicate that the predictive qualities of the lot price model improve as 
the additional independent variables are added, as would be expected, albeit with a low initial 
adjusted R2 and low incremental effect thereafter.  This is not unexpected as vacant lots are 
more homogenous in nature than the housing subsequently built upon them.  
The regression results for the Lot data set for Brisbane are provided in Table 3.  All 
outputs are of the expected sign and significance at five percent probability with the 
exception of income, building approvals and unemployment (all sign and significance); and 
the construction cost index (sign and significance at ten percent).   
Given the linear nature of our model, the interpretation of the infrastructure charge 
coefficient (IA_Ifc_1L) output of 1.693 and significance of .008, is that this result provides 
evidence that a $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges increases new Lot prices in Brisbane 
by $1.69.   
Table 3  Regression Results- Lots 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 164571.585 119.155 .000 161864.335 167278.835 
  Area 152.427 81.545 .000 148.763 156.091 
2 (Constant) -21503629.850 -26.810 .000 -23075791.649 -19931468.051 
  Area 158.724 89.100 .000 155.232 162.216 
  SEIFA 3635.625 9.534 .000 2888.191 4383.058 
  Year 10767.793 26.963 .000 9984.996 11550.590 
  Region 55220.188 36.313 .000 52239.423 58200.954 
3 (Constant) -16734106.193 -4.422 .000 -24151369.149 -9316843.237 
  Area 158.802 89.938 .000 155.341 162.263 
  SEIFA 3446.636 9.062 .000 2701.100 4192.173 
  Year 8281.758 4.422 .000 4610.608 11952.908 
  Region 88386.788 8.313 .000 67545.763 109227.814 
  AC_Inc -295.477 -.114 .910 -5392.846 4801.892 
  AC_Pop 43476.047 6.991 .000 31286.186 55665.908 
  AC_Bul 186.173 .522 .602 -513.070 885.415 
  A_Upr 10457.635 1.113 .266 -7952.611 28867.881 
  A_Cci -4533.609 -1.636 .102 -9966.447 899.228 
  A_Mgr 20413.933 2.099 .036 1354.505 39473.361 
  A_Css -971.569 -2.366 .018 -1776.604 -166.534 
  IA_Ifc_1L 1.693 2.633 .008 .433 2.954 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
As indicated previously, in contrast to house price studies, the evidence on price 
impacts for vacant residential lots is thin.  This is thought to be due to the nature of the US 
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housing market, whereby the land developer also constructs the house thereupon and there is 
only a limited vacant lot market.  This is in contrast to the “house and land” package nature 
of much of the Australian new home market in greenfield estates.  Evans-Cowley et al., 
(2005) provide the only recent evidence of the impact of infrastructure charges on residential 
lot prices.  They provide weak evidence that a $1.00 infrastructure charge is attributed to a 
price increase of as little as a $0.13 for the developed lot (Evans-Cowley et al., 2005).  This is 
a significant under-passing of the charge.  This lower on-passing result when read in 
conjunction with overpassing at the house level, could be interpreted as evidence of 
profiteering by house builders.  This would be a troubling finding as house builders (as 
opposed to land developers when these are two separate suppliers) are not subject to any 
infrastructure charges.  This study provides evidence to support the hypothesis that 
infrastructure charges are over passed to vacant residential lots.  The findings of 169% on-
passing is positive evidence of overpassing and is an important contribution to the 
international literature on lot price effects.   Hence, the findings of this study are an important 
contribution to the literature where an active “house and land” market exists, with potential 
profit taking by house builders to be a consideration for further research.  
Various reasons for overpassing have been hypothesised in the literature, however no 
studies have provided evidence in this regard.  A common proposition for the over shifting 
phenomenon is the suggestion that infrastructure charges add additional uncertainties and 
delay costs in the approval process, resulting in developers recouping more than the cost of 
the fees alone as developers seek compensation for the additional risk taken and return on 
costs (Campbell, 2004, Mathur, 2003).  This overshifting can also be combined with back 
passing to land owners (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004), with developers requiring higher 
profit margins to compensate them for the additional uncertainty associated with a rapidly 
changing regulatory environment.  Further, any additional development costs are increased 
by construction period interest and other development costs determined as a percentage of the 
sale price (Singell and Lillydahl,1990; Crowe 2007).  So not only are infrastructure charges 
passed directly onto new homeowners, there is an overshifting effect to compensate 
developers firstly for the additional uncertainty (risk) and secondly a return of funds invested 
component, either for the developer, or its financier over the development period (Elickson 
and Been, 2005).   
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CONCLUSION 
Housing affordability is at critical levels in Australia and the reasons for this are the 
subject of much policy debate.  Despite a significant body of research on the incidence of 
infrastructure charges on new house prices in the US, there has been very limited academic 
progress in Australia on infrastructure charges’ contribution to residential land prices.  In a 
climate where housing affordability is a policy objective for many governments, a clear 
understanding of the impacts these government charges have on the price of new housing is 
imperative.   
Development industry bodies maintain that infrastructure charges are a significant 
contributor to the supply-side drivers of increasing house prices.  Over three decades of 
theoretical literature from North America is found to be consistent in its findings that 
infrastructure charges increase the price of housing.  However the evidence on lot effects is 
thin and this study provides a contribution to the international literature indicating 
overpassing occurs in this market also. 
To date the Australian academic community has not responded to this issue in an 
empirical manner.  This research provides the first empirical evidence of the impact of 
infrastructure charges on residential land prices in Australia where an active “house and land” 
market exists.  This research provides strong evidence in support of the proposition that not 
only are infrastructure charges passed on to home owners, they are over-passed to vacant 
residential lots in the amount of 169%.  These results are consistent with the international 
evidence of over passing of infrastructure charges and support the hypothesis of this paper.  
The Australian evidence in this instance indicates overpassing to new home owners in the 
order of $1.69 over passing for every $1.00 of infrastructure charge.    
These results will inform governments on the outcomes of their growth management 
strategies on housing affordability, providing the first evidence of its kind in Australia.  
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